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In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the
Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using
the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum
key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which
the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI.
While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security
check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI
used here.
Introduction. In quantum key distribution (QKD), two
distant parties (Alice and Bob) securely share a private
random bit string, whose security against an eavesdrop-
per Eve is based on quantum features like no-cloning and
imperfect distinguishability of non-orthogonal states. A
QKD protocol was first proposed by Bennett and Bras-
sard (BB84) [1]. In a subsequent work, Ekert (E91) [2]
showed how quantum entanglement and quantum viola-
tion of Bell-type inequality (BI) [3, 4] could be used as a
basis for QKD. The intuition behind achieving security
in this way was that Eve’s intervention would tend to dis-
entangle the particles. Spurred on by the E91 protocol,
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [5] proposed a different
entanglement-based scheme that did not require Bell’s
theorem and showed its equivalence with BB84. In the
following years, more sophisticated security proofs were
provided in the context of a variety of attacks on the
transmission channel, culminating in the proof of uncon-
ditional security of BB84 [6].
However, in recent years, it has been realized that the
above mentioned security proofs of QKD schemes have
limited practical value, because of their implicit assump-
tion that all the devices used for state preparation and
measurement are well characterized [7]. For example, in
BB84, the malicious eavesdropper Eve may herself be
the vendor, who supplies states and devices to Alice and
Bob. She may give them higher dimensional states as
“cheat states” instead of those legitimate for the proto-
col, and access the extra dimensions, as shown below, to
compromise the security of the protocol. This type of
attack is known as “device attack”, as opposed to the
usual “channel attack” where Eve intercepts the trans-
mitted states. Thus, a QKD protocol must be secure
against both channel and device attacks. While BB84
is unconditionally secure under channel attacks, it is not
secure in the device-independent (DI) scenario, i.e. one
in which device attacks are allowed.
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It is in this context that we point out how the tem-
poral analogue of the Bell-type inequality, known as the
Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) [8, 9], can be relevant in
formulating QKD schemes in the DI scenario. The as-
sumptions leading to LGI are that a system has definite
values of the observable properties at any given instant,
and that these values can be accessed by noninvasive
measurements. LGI imposes an upperbound on a linear
combination of the correlations P (a, b|x, y) (where a(b)
are outcomes obtained on measuring observables x(y))
between the outcomes of measurements of the observ-
ables at different instants that are obtained by sequential
measurements on the same particle. While the original
motivation leading to LGI was for testing the validity
of QM in the macro-limit, in recent years, LGI has been
applied in various contexts using different micro-systems,
resulting in a number of theoretical [10] and experimental
[11] works. In the light of this upsurge of interest about
LGI, it should be of significance to probe whether LGI
can have an application for ensuring security in a quan-
tum cryptographic task. This specific question has yet
remained unexplored. We note that the only other prior
application of LGI in the area of quantum information
was for saving memory in a quantum information pro-
cessing task [12]. Before proceeding to apply LGI in the
context considered in our paper, we note that the usual
form of LGI involves temporal correlations present in the
two state oscillations. For the purpose of our paper we
consider the form of LGI proposed by Brukner et al. [12].
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin by dis-
cussing the DI scenario involving a typical higher dimen-
sional attack, which we call the AGM attack [13]. Next,
the suitable form of LGI which can be of cryptographic
use is introduced. We then discuss the limitation of a
LG-protocol which is the direct temporal analogue of the
CHSH protocol [13]. Subsequently, we propose a LG-
BB84 protocol to circumvent the limitation affecting the
LG-protocol. In the LG-BB84 protocol, the key genera-
tion is done by the BB84 method using mutually unbi-
ased basis for bit encoding. The security of BB84 against
general channel attacks has been proved in [6, 14]. But,
BB84 is not secure against device attacks, in particular
the AGM attack. We address the insecurity against this
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2particular widely discussed device attack and detect the
AGM attack by introducing an additional basis for Bob
which establishes the required LGI violating correlations
between Alice and Bob. Thus, the security of LG-BB84
in this DI scenario is proven by deriving a positive secret
key rate under a combination of individual channel at-
tack and AGM device attack. Even at lower error rate,
compared to the original scheme, a threat from the AGM
attack may exist, which is detected by a reduction in the
LGI violation. The paper is concluded by summarizing
the salient features of our work and indicating the direc-
tion for further work.
Device-independence. In BB84 Alice transmits states
randomly prepared in the conjugate basis (Eg: Pauli spin
basis, X or Z) and Bob’s random measurements in one of
these two basis. Over a classical channel, they determine
the cases where their bases match, discarding the rest.
On a smaller, randomly selected sample from the retained
cases, Alice and Bob announce their respective outcomes
to compute the error rate. Unless this rate is sufficiently
small, they abort the protocol run. The statistics that
arise in BB84 are: P (a = b|x = y) = 1;P (a = b|x 6= y) =
1
2 . If Eve intercepts Alice’s transmission to acquire infor-
mation, because of the information-vs-disturbance trade-
off, she inevitably disrupts the BB84 statistics, which is
detected by Alice and Bob. This constitutes the essential
security of BB84.
Here it is implicitly assumed that Alice and Bob know
exactly how their correlations P (a, b|x, y) are produced;
in other words, that their devices are trustworthy, and
that they are measuring the properties of the same par-
ticle. In the DI scenario, Eve can cheat by having them
measure different particles using, for example, the fol-
lowing ploy. Eve presents them with the separable state
[13]
ρAB =
1
4
(
Π
(12)
00 + Π
(12)
11
)
⊗
(
Π
(34)
++ + Π
(34)
−−
)
(1)
where Πxy indicates projector to the state |x, y〉. The
bracketed superscripts in the definition of ρAB are par-
ticle labels. Eve has so arranged the devices such that
particles 1 and 3 (2 and 4) are with Alice (Bob). When
Alice and Bob measure Z (X), they measure particles 1
and 2 (3 and 4). Notice that this reproduces the BB84
statistics, but after the public announcement of basis by
Alice and Bob, Eve has the ‘hidden variable’ pertaining
to which pair of particles Alice and Bob measure, she can
find out their secret bit (0 or 1) with certainty without
introducing a disturbance. Eve’s cheating here hinges
on the fact that Alice and Bob believe their system to
be a single system of dimension two (a qubit), while in
fact they are accessing a system of higher (= 16) dimen-
sionality. Thus, it becomes crucial to rule out hidden
dimensions of the Hilbert space describing the quantum
systems used for QKD.
The necessary condition for security in this device-
independent (DI) scenario is that the correlations
P (a, b|x, y) shared between Alice and Bob should satisfy
the following inequality,
P (a, b|x, y) 6=
∑
λ
P (a|x, λ)P (b|y, λ)pλ, (2)
since otherwise it is possible that Eve possesses a copy of
the hidden variable λ, and determines Alice’s and Bob’s
outcomes when they publicly announce x and y. This
implies that P (a, b|x, y) must violate a correlation in-
equality like BI for security and hence Alice and Bob
must share quantum entanglement. It turns out that a
sufficiently large violation of BI for correlations that are
between spatially separated particles guarantees security
not just against a quantum mechanical Eve, but even by
a general Eve restricted only by the no-signaling condi-
tion (Alice’s measurement settings or input should not
influence Bob’s output)[13, 15]. A crucial point to note
here is that the BB84 statistics do not violate BI and
thus is insecure in the DI scenario.
DI scenario using LGI. The form of LGI used in our
discussion is given by [12],
Λ ≡ |〈xt1yt2 + xt1y′t2 + x′t1yt2 − x′t1y′t2〉| ≤ 2 (3)
where at an instant t1 (t2) where t2 > t1, Alice (Bob) may
choose to measure the observable x (y) or x′ (y′). Unlike
the original LGI which involves measuring the same ob-
servable in the presence of time evolution of the system
under consideration, the form of LGI given here involves
measuring different observables without time evolution
of the system. Like the original form of LGI [8], the
inequality given by Eq.(3) is also based on the same as-
sumptions of realism and noninvasive measurability [16]
and can be considered as the temporal version of BI which
is violated by quantum mechanics. In what follows, we
will show how the incorporation of a LGI test based on
testing the violation of the above inequality can secure
the BB84 protocol against the AGM attack even without
the use of entanglement, where the observed reduction in
the violation of the LGI occurs depending on the amount
of device tampering by Eve. Here we note that within
the framework of BB84 scheme, in order to make use of
the causal ordering of the events of Alice and Bob for
ensuring security in the DI scenario, it becomes nesces-
sary and natural to invoke the violation of LGI-type in-
equality that results in the required security contingent
on the assumption of no unauthorized signal leakage. In
the present paper since it focussess on initiating a new
direction of study in QKD, it suffices to consider a typ-
ical device attack such as the AGM attack [13], and in
this context we not consider more general device attacks
[17, 18] which will be studied in a sequel paper. Before
proceeding to discuss our prpoposed protocol, it may be
useful to refer to Fig. 1 which illustrates the difference
between the settings involving spatial and temporal cor-
relations considered in the DI scenario.
If one wishes to have an LG protocol, the temporal ana-
logue of the CHSH protocol, then Alice and Bob have the
choice of measuring two dichotomic observables x, x′ and
3y, y′ respectively, whose outcome statistics can be used
to test LGI violation. After many trials, Alice announces
her settings (x or x′) and Bob keeps his outcomes as-is for
all cases except for the last setting (x′, y′), in which case
he flips his outcome. This step is known as basis reconcil-
iation. The violation of LGI (Eq. (3)) would ensure that
with high probability their data has positive correlation
(i.e., is more correlated than anti-correlated). To share
an identical secure key they proceed with further clas-
sical cryptographic post-processing. As the cheat state
ρAB cannot violate LGI, this protocol offers a natural
protection against the higher dimension attack.
Note that an LG protocol obtained as the temporal
analogue of the CHSH protocol [13] may seem to have
the same security implications. However, we will find
that the temporal correlations are characterized by inva-
siveness (or “signaling”, in the framework of correlations)
which results in a weakening of the monogamy bound.
What we mean by this is that, given the sequential mea-
surements for temporal correlations by Alice, followed by
Eve and then Bob, we find (Appendix A)
ΛAE + ΛAB ≤ 2
√
2 +
√
2 = 3
√
2. (4)
which is larger than 4, the no-signaling bound applica-
ble to the spatial correlations [19]. The above relation
implies that if Alice-Eve correlation violates LGI, then
a subsequent measurement by Bob cannot establish the
same amount of correlation between Alice-Bob. Eve’s
intervening measurement during the particle’s channel
transit renders Alice-Bob correlations separable (where√
2 is the separable bound). Note that if the measure-
ments are ‘anchored’ on E, then we have
ΛAE + ΛBE ≤ 2× 2
√
2 = 4
√
2 (5)
as already observed in [12]. This implies that Eve can
simultaneously share the LGI violating correlations be-
tween Alice and Bob. This demonstrates the weakening
of monogamy in the case of temporal correlations and
has the cryptographic implication that, to be assured of
security, a larger degree violation of LGI would be re-
quired in the LG protocol than the degree of violation
of the CHSH inequality required in the CHSH protocol.
However, the LG protocol is conceptually important be-
cause it highlights the fundamental difference between
spatial and temporal correlations, from the perspective
of security.
LG-BB84 protocol. The discussion in the previous sec-
tion suggests that it would be advantageous to decou-
ple the device attack detection (LGI test affected by the
weakening of monogamy) from the key generation (which
is done by the BB84 scheme) and channel attack detec-
tion (which is independent of LGI violation and hence
of weakening of monogamy). For this purpose, to estab-
lish the LGI violating correlations between Alice-Bob,
we introduce an additional basis M± ≡ 1√2 (X ± Y ) at
Bob’s end. Based on these considerations, we propose
the LG-BB84 protocol as follows:(1) Alice prepares states
M   M  M  M 
 X, X' 
  α, α'  
   Y, Y' 
  β, β' 
X, X'  
  α, α' 
  Y, Y' 
  β , β' 
Single photon 
   Entangled Photons 
   Alice                                                           Bob                                       Alice                                                      Bob 
               
Temporal Spatial 
FIG. 1. Temporal vs spatial correlations considered in the
DI scenario. In the temporal case, Alice and Bob perform
sequential measurements on the same particle using different
non-commuting observables at different times to obtain LGI
violation. In the spatial case, Alice and Bob measure spatially
separated entangled particles using commuting observables at
the same instant.
randomly in X or Y basis; (2) Bob measures the incom-
ing photons randomly in X, Y or M± basis; (3) After
Bob classically acknowledges receipt, Alice announces her
preparation bases, as does Bob his measurement bases.
(4) In cases where their bases are matched, the result-
ing outcomes constitute the raw key. If their bases are
mismatched and Bob measured in the X or Y basis, the
outcomes are discarded. If their bases are mismatched
and Bob measures M±,the outcomes are used to test for
violation of the following form of LGI obtained by rewrit-
ing Eq.(3) where x(x′) and y(y′) are replaced by X(Y )
and M+(M−) respectively:
ΛAB ≡ |〈Xt1M+t2+Xt1M−t2+Yt1M+t2−Yt1M−t2〉| ≤ 2,
(6)
where Alice has the choice of preparing the photon state
in X or Y at time t1 and Bob measures the correspond-
ing state in either M+ or M− basis at time t2 (t2 > t1).
Eve intervenes at a time t′1 (t1 < t
′
1 < t2). The cheat
state cannot pass the LGI test since (ΛAB(ρAB) = 0),
essentially because LGI-violating temporal correlations
cannot be established by measuring two different parti-
cles. The LGI test thus serves like an identity check on
Bob’s particle, certifying that it is the same particle that
Alice transmitted.
Let us consider an eavesdropping model which is a
combination of device- and channel-attacks. For the de-
vice attack, Eve mixes a fraction f of the cheat states
ρAB with the legitimate BB84 states. For the channel
attack, Eve intercepts individual qubits and makes them
interact with her ancillary qubit via the following unitary
evolution [20]:
U |00〉BE = |00〉BE
U |10〉BE = cos θ|10〉BE + sin θ|01〉BE . (7)
where θ ∈ [0, pi/2] is the attack parameter (a measure
of interaction between transmitted qubit-ancilla system).
Eve then waits for the public announcement of bases and
measures her ancilla in the appropriate basis correspond-
ing to each transmitted qubit. For individual attacks the
interaction in Eq.(7) is optimal[21] in the sense that for
a given degree of noise, Eve’s mutual information with
Alice I(A : E) is maximal.
4Suppose, f = 0, i.e. the cheat states ρAB are absent.
Then, error rates as seen by Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve and
Bob-Eve due to Eve’s channel attack alone (Appendix B)
are respectively given by, eAB = (1−cos θ)/2, eAE = (1−
sin θ)/2 and eBE = (1−sin 2θ)/2, irrespective of the basis
or transmitted bit (cf. [22]). The condition for extracting
a shorter secure key from a longer raw key (using one-
way communication protocols for key reconciliation and
privacy amplification), i.e. for deriving a positive key
rate [23] i.e. I(A : B) > IE ≡ min[I(A : E), I(B : E)].
This criterion in our protocol is satisfied when θ ≤ pi4
for which eAB . 14.6% and ΛAB ≥ 2
√
2 cos(θ). This
implies that the protocol is secure when the error rate
is less than the above tolerable limit and precisely when
it is LGI violating. Thus the condition for security is
equivalent to the requirement that Alice-Bob correlation
data violates LGI.
Let f > 0, corresponding to Eve launching both the
channel and device attacks. The error rate and the LGI
violation observed by Alice and Bob gets modified to:
e′AB = (1− f)eAB =
1
2
(1− f)(1− cos θ).
ΛAB = 2
√
2 cos θ(1− f). (8)
Correspondingly, Alice-Bob mutual information is given
by I(A : B) = 1 − H (e′AB), while Alice-Eve mutual in-
formation is as follows
I(A : E) = (1− f)(1−H(eAE)) + f, (9)
(Eve knows the bit value determinsitically in fraction
f corresponding to the device attack ), where H is
Shannon binary entropy; and similarly for I(B : E).
From the above equation, we observe that for constant
θ, with f increasing, the protocol becomes insecure at
lower error rates (see Figure 2). This is because Eve
produces fixed channel error due to her channel attack
while gaining more information on the secret bits using
the cheat states. From Figure 2, we see that the range
10.9% . eAB . 14.6%, which is secure under the chan-
nel attack alone, is insecure in the DI scenario considered.
Such eavesdropping is detected using the LGI violation
and would not be detected otherwise. Thus, Alice and
Bob can determine the highest tolerable error rate and
bound their key rate only with the combined BB84 and
LGI data, and solving for θ and f using Eqs. (8).
Summary and Concluding remarks. In the non-DI sce-
nario, standard BB84 is known to be secure. In the DI
scenario, the possibility of mistrusted devices is allowed.
In this case, for the security, entanglement is believed to
be essential. As a result, all the proposed QKD protocols
to-date in the DI scenario are entanglement-based. In
contrast, the present paper shows the possibility of avoid-
ing the use of entanglement for the type of DI scenario
considered in the context of AGM attack [13]. This is
done by augmenting BB84 with a security check through
the testing of the violation of an inequality (namely, an
appropriate form of LGI) involving the correlations be-
tween the results of temporally separated measurements
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
e
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
FIG. 2. The upper pair of lines represent an LGI test, while
the lower pair represent positive key rate K ≡ IAB − IE , as
a function of e ≡ eAB . The solid (dashed) lines represent the
case f = 0 (f = 0.2), where f is the fraction of higher dimen-
sion attack by Eve. As f increases, Eve produces less channel
error for the same level of knowledge about the transmitted
secret bits. Device tampering by Eve leads to a reduction in
the violation of LGI. This, along with the channel attacks,
reduces the error rate.
of suitable observables. Our key demonstration is that,
for the AGM attack by Eve in the DI scenario, our pro-
tocol is secure, whereas BB84 is not.
A few points need to be mentioned here. First, the
temporal correlations present in LGI are less monoga-
mous than their spatial counterparts in BI in that the
right hand side of Eq. (4) can exceed 4. As we have
explained earlier, this makes the LG protocol less secure
than the CHSH protocol, highlighting a basic difference
between the spatial and temporal correlations. Second,
in the LG-BB84 protocol proposed here, the tolerable
error rate depends on the combined LGI and the BB84
data, while the scheme in itself may be considered as the
prepare-and-measure version of E91 protocol.
Note that in the DI scenario that has been consid-
ered, it is assumed that there are no state transmis-
sions of cheat states and that devices are memoryless.
If the former assumption is given up, then the security
can be proven in the semi-device-independent scenario
[18], where the dimensionality of the transmitted state is
bounded from above using dimension witnesses [24, 25].
If the latter assumption is not made, then memory at-
tacks can occur in which devices procured from adver-
sarial suppliers may reveal information about inputs and
outcomes of earlier runs through the public communica-
tion channel used in the subsequent runs [17]. Against
such general attacks, DI security can be proven[26, 27]
provided errors are less than 2%[28]. On the other hand,
since our work initiates an entirely new direction of study
by exploiting LGI, in order to illustrate its efficacy, we
have used, to begin with, a specific typical and widely
discussed device attack (AGM Attack). Subsequently,
this paper will be followed by sequel works pursuing the
extension of this type of novel scheme towards making it
secure against more general attacks in the DI scenario.
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Appendix A: Monogamy in the case of temporal
correlations
Let Alice and Bob establish correlations by sequen-
tially measuring observables xˆ and yˆ on a given qubit at
respective instants t1 and t2. The probability for Bob to
obtain outcome β on input xˆ, after Alice obtained out-
come α on input xˆ is:
Pαβ|xˆyˆ = Tr
(
1 + βyˆ
2
1 + αxˆ
2
ρ
1 + αxˆ
2
)
=
1
4
+
α
4
Tr(xˆρ) +
β
8
Tr(yˆρ) +
β
8
Tr(xˆyˆxˆρ) +
αβ
8
Tr({xˆ, yˆ}ρ), (A1)
where outcomes α, β = ±1. Therefore, Bob’s marginal
Pβ|xy =
∑
α Pαβ|xy =
1
4 +
β
8Tr(yˆρ) +
β
8Tr(xˆyˆxˆρ) depends
on Alice’s setting (while the converse is not true). This
dependence of Bob’s outcome probability on Alice’s set-
tings, which is simply a manifestation of invasiveness,
makes temporal correlations signaling [24]. If the correla-
tions Pαβ|xˆyˆ are non-signaling, then the following bound
holds [18]:
ΛBellAE + Λ
Bell
AB ≤ 4. (A2)
where the superscript “Bell” indicates that the correla-
tions are spatial in this case. Temporal correlations vio-
late this bound.
Now consider the case of consecutive measurements xˆ,
eˆ and yˆ performed at t1, t2 and t3 (t1 < t2 < t3) respec-
6tively:
〈xˆ, yˆ〉 =
∑
m,n,o=±1
mo Tr [ρΠmx ] Tr [Π
m
x Π
n
e ] Tr
[
ΠneΠ
o
y
]
= (x · e)(e · y), (A3)
where Πmn is the projector in general along direction n
with outcome m. Eq. (A3) implies that the third correla-
tion is “temporally” disentangled from first [12], when the
second measurement is projective. Thus, if Eve attacks
and measures at a time t′1 in between Alice and Bob’s
measurements, she completely disentangles them. The
Alice-Bob correlation does not violate LGI since their
states are rendered “temporally” separable.
We note that the l.h.s of (A3) has the form of measure-
ment on the product state of the identical copies with
Bloch vector e, along directions x and e. For separa-
ble states in quantum mechanics, it can be shown that
Λ ≤ √2, whereas the local bound is 2. The separable
bound is saturated with settings x′, y, x and y′ being
coplanar, separated by angle pi/4, with e = y. As a re-
sult, we have for the above sequential measurements (Eq.
(4)): ΛAE + ΛAB ≤ 2
√
2 +
√
2 = 3
√
2.
Appendix B: Error rate and LGI violation in
LG-BB84
Suppose Alice transmits the state |±〉X = 1√2 (|0〉±|1〉).
Subjected to the attack of Eq. (7), this becomes the state
τ±X (θ) :=
1
2
(
1 + sin2(θ) ± cos(θ)
± cos(θ) cos2(θ),
)
(B1)
while Eve’s probe is left in the state:
τ ′±X (θ) :=
1
2
(
1 + cos2(θ) ± sin(θ)
± sin(θ) sin2(θ)
)
. (B2)
Similar expressions are obtained for Alice’s and Eve’s
state when a Y -basis state is transmitted, given respec-
tively by τ±Y (θ) and τ
′±
Y (θ). It turns out that the proba-
bility that Eve’s attack leads to an error is the same for
any of Alice’s four preparations, and is given by:
eAB = X〈∓|τ±X |∓〉X = Y 〈∓|τ±Y |∓〉Y = sin2(θ/2). (B3)
It can be shown that Eve’s optimal projective measure-
ment to distinguish τ ′+X (θ) (τ
′+
Y (θ)) from τ
′−
X (θ) (τ
′−
Y (θ))
is by measuring her probe in the X (Y ) basis. To see this,
suppose that Alice announces the transmitted state to be
in the X basis, and let Eve measure her probe in the ba-
sis having one of the projectors to be |ξ〉 = α|0〉+βeiγ |1〉,
where α, β and γ are real numbers. One finds
〈ξ| (τ ′+X (θ)− τ ′−X (θ)) |ξ〉 = 2αβ sin(θ) cos(γ).
Maximizing this quantity, it follows that we should set
γ = 0 while α = β = 1√
2
. If Alice announces X, then
Eve measures her probe in the same basis, and likewise
for Alice’s announcement of Y . The error rate of Eve on
Alice’s transmission is:
eAE = X〈 ∓ |ρ′±X |∓〉X = Y 〈 ∓ |ρ′±Y |∓〉Y =
1
2
(1− sin(θ)).
(B4)
The error rate on transmissions between Bob and Eve is
obtained from Eqs. (B3) and (B4) and found to be:
eBE = eAB (1− eAE) + (1− eAB) eAE
=
1
2
(1− sin(2θ)). (B5)
The LGI inequality (3) is now represented by one in
which the first correlatum is given by the BB84 state
preparation weighted by its preparation probability. For
example, the first term in Ineq. (3) is given by P (y =
+1|x = +1)P (x = +1) + P (y = −1|x = −1)P (x =
−1) + P (y = +1|x = −1)P (x = −1) + P (y = −1|x =
+1)P (x = +1). Thus Ineq. (3) now becomes:
ΛAB =
1
2
([
P
(|+〉M+ ||+〉X)+ P (|−〉M+ ||−〉X)− P (|+〉M+ ||−〉X)− P (|−〉M+ ||+〉X)]
+
[
P
(|+〉M− ||+〉X)+ P (|−〉M− ||−〉X)− P (|+〉M− ||−〉X)− P (|−〉M− ||+〉X)]
− [P (|+〉M+ ||+〉Y )+ P (|−〉M+ ||−〉Y )− P (|+〉M+ ||−〉Y )− P (|−〉M+ ||+〉Y )]
+
[
P
(|+〉M− ||+〉Y )+ P (|−〉M− ||−〉Y )− P (|+〉M− ||−〉Y )− P (|−〉M− ||+〉Y )])
= 2
√
2 cos(θ). (B6)
where |±〉M± are the eigenstates of M± and we as-
sume that P (|±〉X) = P (|±〉Y ) = 12 . Interestingly, the
quantity 2
√
2 saturates the upper bound obtained by
the Horodeckis criterion in the equivalent entanglement-
based protocol [21]. The quantity analogous to (B6)
may be calculated similarly for the Alice-Eve correla-
tions, which we find to be:
ΛAE = 2
√
2 sin(θ). (B7)
